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Abstract 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 has been enacted and will come into force in April 2016.  The purpose 
of the Act is to provide a balanced framework to secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces.  The 
Act promotes the provision of information, guidance and education and also seeks to secure compliance through 
effective and appropriate compliance measure, including criminal prosecution.  The deterrent effect of 
prosecution is likely to inhibit the parties’ willingness to engage in the open and transparent information 
sharing.  This has the potential to create an unsatisfactory equilibrium in terms of achieving the regulatory goal 
where there is insufficient information and certainty to both comply with, and enforce, the legislation effectively.  
This can be addressed by the use of compliance and enforcement policies enabling regulators to take a strategic 
approach to the use of prosecution as a compliance tool and to signal when prosecution will be used, however 
the capacity for private prosecution adds an element of unpredictability for all parties. 
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I Introduction 
The Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 (HSW Act) has recently been enacted and will 
come into force in April next year. 1  Developed in response to the Pike River tragedy, where 
29 men were killed in November 2010 when there was an explosion in the underground mine 
at Pike River on the West Coast of New Zealand’s South Island, the new law is modelled on 
the Australian Model Health and Safety Act.2   
Proponents of health and safety reform advocated a number of changes, including: a new 
Act; a single focus regulator who would provide detailed guidance material to operators; 
stronger deterrent measures; and a modern, risk-based approach to promoting and enforcing 
compliance. 3 
While a recommendation to introduce an offence of corporate manslaughter4 was not 
implemented, the new Act has a greater number of criminal offences with higher penalties.5  
These are intended to operate as a harsh deterrent to both promote compliance and punish 
non-compliance.  They are expected to operate as part of a suite of enforcement tools to be 
used strategically by the regulator to achieve the purposes of the Act. 
The challenges in regulating for socially valuable outcomes, such as health and safety, 
include striking an appropriate balance between information-gathering and enforcement.  
Where regulation includes criminal prosecution as an enforcement measure, this is likely to 
inhibit openness on the part of regulated parties and focus attention on the letter of the law.  
The purpose of this paper is to consider the influence of potential prosecution on the way that 
the Act is intended to operate.   
Because a criminal conviction can result in deprivation of liberty or a significant financial 
penalty (or both), as well as reputational damage, the Legislation Advisory Committee 
cautions that the decision to create new criminal offences in legislation should not be taken 
lightly and criminalising behaviour should be reserved for the most egregious situations 
where alternative enforcement measures are not considered to be sufficient.6  Similarly, the 
decision to prosecute in specific instances is considered to be appropriate only where there are 
clear breaches of the law and the public interest supports prosecution.7   
                                                     
1 Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, s 2 
2 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 C2011A00137 (Australia) 
3 Report of the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, (Wellington, New Zealand, October 
2012) <pikeriver.royalcommission.govt.nz> 
4 Above n 3, 310 at [31], [32] 
5 See, in particular, ss 47 – 49  
6 Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on the Process and Content of Legislation, (Legislation Advisory 
Committee, October 2014) [http://www.lac.org.nz/guidelines/], at Chapter 21 
7 Crown Law, Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines 2013 (Crown Law Office, Wellington, 1 July 2013) at 
6 
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Compliance and enforcement theory echoes this, with currently influential schools of 
thought advocating an approach to compliance by regulators where there is either an 
escalating response to non-compliance, or the regulator chooses an enforcement option from a 
range of responses, after weighing a number of criteria.  In such cases, it is usual to describe a 
triangle, or pyramid, of enforcement options, with prosecution always being depicted at, or 
near, the top.  This visual depiction reinforces the idea that prosecution is a serious punitive 
enforcement measure to be reserved for the most serious cases. 
While prosecution may be considered to be a tool to be used only in serious cases, many 
compliance theorists support its inclusion as an enforcement measure, considering that the 
threat of potentially harsh penalties does more to encourage compliance that a mere ‘advise 
and persuade’ approach. 8  Many writers also consider that prosecution is likely to be more 
suitable where a breach of duty could result in a catastrophic outcome such as serious injury 
or death.  In such cases, an escalating or negotiated approach to enforcement is not considered 
to be suitable.9   
Key issues I wish to consider in this paper are: do harsher penalties work to effectively 
promote compliance and deter non-compliance?  And what is influence of the threat of 
prosecution on the regulatory relationship? I will discuss the potential for an atmosphere of 
distrust to develop among the regulated community.  This could result in a lack of co-
operation and inhibit information-sharing by regulated parties, reducing information available 
to develop education and guidance.   
Next, I will look at the issue of compliance and enforcement policies.  While some 
approaches advocate an approach to encouraging compliance whereby regulators adopt an 
escalating, negotiated, approach, rewarding co-operation and willingness to comply, this is 
considered less suitable in the case where serious injury or death could result.  In such cases, 
prosecution is considered to be a suitable response, but one that requires legal certainty to be 
used effectively.  A more suitable approach to encouraging and enforcing health and safety 
compliance is considered to be for the regulator to select the most appropriate enforcement 
tool depending on the seriousness of the breach.   
However the capacity for New Zealand regulators to take a strategic approach to health 
and safety compliance and enforcement may be affected by the potential for private 
prosecutions under the HSW Act.10  The Act continues the ability for third parties to 
prosecute where the regulator has decided not to do so.  This is not a feature of the Australian 
or UK health and safety regimes, and needs to be considered alongside New Zealand’s 
                                                     
8 Elizabeth Bluff, Neil Gunningham, Richard Johnstone, OHS Regulation for a Changing World of Work, 
(Federation Press, Sydney, 2004) at 150  
9 Richard Johnstone and Michael Tooma Work Health and Safety Regulation in Australia: The Model Act, 
(Federation Press, Australia, 2012) At 254 - 257 
10 S 144 
Regulation of Health and Safety in the Workplace: the Role of Prosecution as a Regulatory Instrument  
 
5 
Accident Compensation system which prohibits civil actions for personal injury.11  Recent 
amendments to the Sentencing Act provide for reparation payments to ‘top up’ ACC 
entitlements thereby operating as potential financial incentive for injured workers to 
prosecute.12     
This paper is structured in 10 Parts: 
• Part 1 sets out the introduction;  
• Part II sets out the background to the new HSW Act and gives an overview of key 
aspects of the content of the Act;  
• Part III discusses the challenge of regulating for health and safety;  
• Part IV examines the need for need for clarity and certainty of meaning in command 
and control regulation; 
• Part V discusses the potential deterrent effect of harsher penalties; 
• Part VI sets out information regarding responsive regulation and the use of compliance 
and enforcement policies; 
• Part VII discusses the impact of private prosecutions;  
• Part VIII briefly looks at the issue of alternatives to prosecution;  
• Part IX sets out some practical issues with prosecutions; and 
• Part x provides concluding thoughts. 
II  Background and overview of the Act 
A Background 
On 30 October 2012, the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy 
delivered its final report to the Governor-General.13 The report followed the tragic deaths of 
29 men in November 2010 when there was an explosion in the underground mine at Pike 
River on the West Coast of New Zealand’s South Island. 
The Royal Commission’s report set out 16 recommendations.14  The report included an 
analysis of the existing approach to enforcement (which was considered to favour light-
handed and negotiated compliance measures).  It recommended that the New Zealand 
offences and penalties for failure to comply with health and safety duties be reviewed and that 
increased penalties and an offence of corporate manslaughter should be considered.15  
                                                     
11 Accident Compensation Act 2001, s317 
12 Sentencing Amendment Act 2014, s 6 
13 Above, n 3 
14 Volume 1 at 36  
15 Volume 2 at 309, 310 
Regulation of Health and Safety in the Workplace: the Role of Prosecution as a Regulatory Instrument  
 
6 
Following this report, and in line with the Royal Commission’s recommendations, an 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety was established.   From the work of 
that Taskforce, several key changes were proposed to the regulation and administration of 
workplace health and safety in New Zealand.16   
 One of the changes was the establishment of the Crown entity, Worksafe New Zealand, 
as New Zealand’s primary health and safety regulator.  Worksafe’s vision is that - “Everyone 
who goes to work comes home healthy and safe.”17  It is clear that the vision is aspirational 
and, unfortunately, will never be achieved with 100% success. 
 The work of the Taskforce also resulted in the HSW Act.  The HSW Act states, at section 
3, that its purpose is to create ‘a balanced framework to secure the health and safety of 
workers and workplaces’. 
 
 The Act is based on the Australian Model Health and Safety Law and replaces the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (the HSEA). 18   These instruments follow the approach 
outlined in the 1972 UK Robens Report which resulted in the replacement of a large number 
of prescriptive health and safety laws with legislation setting out high level duties and 
promoting voluntary self-regulation, supported by industry guidance and enforcement through 
prosecution.  Named after Lord Alfred Robens, chair of the UK Committee on Health and 
Safety at Work established in 1970, its 1972 report to the British government, Safety and 
Health at Work, transformed the attitudes towards and organisation of occupational health and 
safety.19  This approach formed the basis for health and safety regulation in the UK, Australia 
and New Zealand.  
A report to the Cabinet Economic Growth and Innovation Committee proposing health 
and safety law reform stated as follows: 20 
 
The Robens approach seeks to increase awareness, knowledge and competence in 
managing workplace health and safety, rather than rely on prescriptive requirements 
focusing on a narrow range of workplace hazards. Performance-based general duties ensure 
broad coverage of work and workplaces. Advantages of the all-encompassing nature of 
these general duties are that they do not quickly date, they support innovation and they 
                                                     
16 Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, (April 2013) online at <hstaskforce.govt.nz> 
17 http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe 
18 above, n 2  
19 Robens (1972) Report of the Committee on Health and Safety at Work 1970-1972, (Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London, 1972) 
20 http://www.mbie.govt.nz/pdf-library/what-we-do/workplace-health-and-safety-reform/effective-regulatory-
framework.pdf (Undated but the proposals relate to the current Health and Safety at Work Act) 
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provide flexibility. The duties are underpinned by industry- or hazard-specific regulations, 
approved codes of practice and guidance where further clarity is required.  
 
 It is notable that both Australia and New Zealand have chosen to continue to follow this 
approach despite the fact that the two jurisdictions were prompted to opt for reform of their 
respective health and safety laws for different reasons.  In Australia, the impetus came from a 
wish to harmonise the approach to health and safety regulation across the various 
jurisdictions.21  In New Zealand, the catalyst was a disaster which was partially attributed to 
the regulatory regime in place at the time and the way that it had been administered.  
The Independent Taskforce cited Ayres and Braithwaite, and stated that “Modern regulator 
practice is for regulators to have the ability to apply a range of approaches to ensuring 
compliance, depending on the circumstances.” 22 
The Taskforce also recommended measures to increase the penalties for poor health and 
safety performance, including stronger penalties and cost recovery, and visible and effective 
compliance activity.23   
B Content of the Act 
The HSW Act replaces an Act which was approximately 60 sections long with one that is 
over 230 sections.  However the high level approach is essentially similar.  The fact that an 
approach developed in the 1970’s continues to be seen as the preferred option for regulating 
health and safety at work confirms the law-makers’ view that this style of regulation does not 
date, supports innovation, and provides flexibility. 
The purpose of the new Act includes:  ‘a balanced framework to secure the health and 
safety of workers and workplaces’ by “protecting workers and other persons against harm to 
their health, safety, and welfare by eliminating or minimising risks arising from work or from 
prescribed high-risk plant”.  The purposes also include “…securing compliance with this Act 
through effective and appropriate compliance and enforcement measures”. 24  The purpose 
provision requires that in furthering this purpose:25 
… regard must be had to the principle that workers and other persons should be given the 
highest level of protection against harm to their health, safety, and welfare from hazards 
and risks arising from work or from specified types of plant as is reasonably practicable.    
                                                     
21 Above n, 9 at 1  
22 Above n 16 p51 at [201], Ayres, I and Braithwaite, J (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
deregulation debate. Oxford University Press, Oxford,  
23 Above n 16 p 86 at [369].  The Taskforce recommended extending the existing manslaughter offence to 
corporations and revising the corporate liability framework that applies to all offences (including 
manslaughter), however it did not recommend introducing a new offence of corporate manslaughter.   
24 S3 
25 S3(2) 
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The Act establishes duties that must be fulfilled by key parties26 and a range of measures 
to promote and enforce compliance, including offences for failure to carry out those duties.27  
This is consistent with the fact that a failure to comply with a duty under the Act may lead to 
serious injury or death – in other words the stakes are high.  As noted above, while a 
recommendation to introduce a new offence of corporate manslaughter28 was not 
implemented, the new Act has a greater number of criminal offences with higher penalties.29   
 The key duty holder is a ‘person who conducts a business or undertaking’ (PCBU).30  The 
terms: ‘business’ and ‘undertaking’ are not defined in the Act.   The primary duty of care 
requires a PCBU to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of 
workers who work for the PCBU while the workers are at work in the business or 
undertaking; and workers whose activities in carrying out work are influenced or directed by 
the PCBU, while the workers are carrying out the work.31 
 
  In line with the Royal Commission’s recommendations, to provide the necessary 
certainty and the specificity to operate at a practical level, the implementation and operation 
of the Act is reliant on the development of guidance and educational material and subordinate 
regulation.32   
 Because the HSW Act establishes a high level framework, it was noted by the law-
makers in developing the legislation that:33 
…in order to address uncertainty and regulatory gaps, regulations, guidance and ACOPs 
[approved codes of practice] will need to be developed to provide duty-holders and 
workers with certainty about how the law and regulations will apply to them, without being 
unnecessarily prescriptive. This will not only promote better health and safety outcomes, 
but will make compliance easier for businesses. 
Over time, in addition to regulations, guidance, and educational material published by the 
regulator, the high level prescription in the Act will also be further interpreted and informed 
by case law developed by the courts.   
In relation to proposed compliance and enforcement under the new Act, Worksafe’s 
website states that: 34 
                                                     
26 Ss 30 - 46 
27 Part 4  
28 Above n 3 and n 16 
29 Ss 47 - 49 
30 S 17 
31 S 36 
32 See ss 211 - 228 
33 Paper to Cabinet Committee MBIE-MAKO-146085572 
34 http://www.business.govt.nz/worksafe/about/reform/9-compliance-enforcement 
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The Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety considered that the current 
penalties under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 were too low and the range 
of compliance and enforcement tools available to inspectors too limited.  Reflecting the 
Taskforce’s recommendations, the Bill provides a range of new and existing enforcement 
tools and compliance mechanisms to the regulator, inspectors and the Court.”  
In terms of the recommendations regarding modern, responsive approach to 
compliance,35 the purposes of the Act include ‘securing compliance with this Act through 
effective and appropriate compliance and enforcement measures’36, and the Act also requires 
regulators to publish information about their approach to enforcing compliance with relevant 
health and safety regulation.37   
 The Bill sets out a number of statutory compliance measures.  These include: 
• three tiers of offences for breaches of statutory health and safety duties;38 
• a requirement to notify significant health and safety events to the regulator and an 
offence for contravening this requirement;39 
• a regulation-making power to prohibit the undertaking of certain work unless it has 
been authorised (by way of a licence, permit, registration or other authority);40 
• the power of the regulator to issue improvement, prohibition and non-disturbance 
notices;41 
• a power for the regulator to take remedial action and recover costs;42 
• enforceable undertakings;43 and 
• private prosecutions.44 
 
In addition, as government agencies, the regulators will be able exercise light-handed 
non-statutory functions, for example sector engagement, education, and publishing general 
guidance information.  In line with the recommended approach to regulatory compliance and 
enforcement, it is envisaged that, in practice, the regulator will seek to use a ‘responsive’ 
approach, selecting the appropriate enforcement tool after weighing a number of relevant 
criteria.   
                                                     
35 Above n 16, p 51 at [210], [211] 
36 S 3(1)(e) 
37  S 190 and s 10 Worksafe New Zealand Act 2013 
38 Ss 47 - 49 
39 S 56 
40 Ss 203 - 208 
41 Ss 101 - 111 
42 Ss 119 - 121 
43 Ss 123 - 129 
44 S 144 
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  The Act includes new maximum penalties on conviction of up to $3 million or up to 5 
years imprisonment.45  This is a significant change from the current maximum penalties in the 
Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 (HSE Act) of up to $500,000 fine and/or 
imprisonment of up to 2 years.46   
III   Challenge of regulating for health and safety  
 As noted in the introduction, one of the issues that regulators seeking to achieve socially 
valuable goals must determine is what type of regulatory approach they wish to use.  In the 
case of health and safety regulation, a key issue is whether the emphasis is on information-
gathering or deterrence.  As noted, the HSW Act includes stronger deterrent measures than 
the 1992 HSE Act.  The threat of prosecution is intended to encourage compliance, however it 
is also likely to discourage openness on the part of regulated parties who will be mindful of 
potential exposure to legal liability. 
 
 By way of contrast, the theory of safety culture or ‘just culture’ is based on a view that 
where regulated parties do not fear blame and reprisals they will be more open about their 
practices.  This will result in regulators being able to find out the real cause of accidents and 
take steps to prevent them in the future.  The theory being that it is more important to improve 
safety than it is to attribute blame and punish operators. 
 
 While this is not the approach adopted in the HSW Act, that Act does rely on interaction 
with regulated parties to develop specific guidance and to educate and inform.  Therefore, it is 
important to understand the effect of strong penalties on the regulatory relationship.  The 
following section describes the principles underlying the ‘no blame’ theory and how it is seen 
as a way to facilitate openness.  This helps illustrate the potentially paradoxical nature of the 
HSW Act, which relies on interaction but includes the threat of significant penalties.  By way 
of illustration, I have provided some examples of different regulatory instruments operating 
on the spectrum from no-blame through to criminal offence based legislation. 
 
  
                                                     
45 S 47 
46 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, s 49 
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A No blame approach 
 James Reason discusses the concept of safety culture and a ‘just culture’.  He explores 
the idea of ‘safety cultures’ within organisations. 47  He argues that:48 
… a safe culture is an informed culture and this, in turn, depends upon creating an effective 
reporting culture that is underpinned by a just culture in which the line between acceptable 
and unacceptable behavior is clearly drawn and understood. 
His focus is on the organisational culture in a particular industry and the factors that 
influence safety.  Reason quotes Uttal’s definition of safety culture: 49 
 Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an 
organisations structures and control systems to produce behavioral norms (the way we do 
things around here).   
Reason considers that, to avoid a sense of complacency caused in some cases by a lack of 
direct experience of unsafe events, organisations must create an ‘informed culture’.  His view 
is that the only way to create an informed culture is to have a ‘reporting culture’ and he notes 
that this creates challenges as it requires operators to be open about mistakes and unsafe 
practices.  His view is that the only way to encourage the required degree of openness and 
encourage a reporting culture is trust.  He states that: “An effective reporting system depends, 
crucially, upon how an organisation handles blame and punishment.”50   
However he appears to acknowledge that it is not realistic or desirable to have a system 
completely without blame but it may be possible to identify and ensure that all parties are 
aware of a “line…between unacceptable behavior, deserving of disciplinary action, and the 
remainder, where punishment is neither appropriate not helpful in furthering the cause of 
safety.”51  This can be seen as having a degree of consistency with aspects of other regulatory 
theorists, including the theories of responsive regulation discussed below, although as I have 
discussed later in this paper, where prosecution remains a possibility it will colour the 
regulatory relationship and limit the responses realistically open to the regulator in serious 
cases.   
In order for parties to be confident that they will not be prosecuted, there would need to 
be immunity from liability, which significantly limits the way regulators can act.  I have set 
out two examples of where this approach has been taken in legislation where information 
gathering is the primary purpose.   
                                                     
47 James Reason “Achieving a safe culture: theory and practice” Work & Stress (1998) Vol. 12, NO. 3 at 
293-306, Department of Psychology, University of Manchester, Manchester  
48 P 1 
49 Uttal, B. “The corporate culture vultures” Fortune Magazine, 17 October 1983 
50 P 302 
51 P 303 
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B Legislative examples and immunity from criminal liability 
As noted above, there are some examples of where the ‘no blame’ approach described 
above has been incorporated into legislation, for example in relation to accident investigation.  
In such a case, the legislation may override the right against self-incrimination but provide 
that the information cannot be used in criminal proceedings against that person.  This is likely 
to be where there is considered to be a higher value in obtaining the information than 
preserving the ability to use this in a prosecution. 
An example is in the Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990.  The 
purpose of the Commission is: “…to determine the circumstances and causes of accidents and 
incidents with a view to avoiding similar occurrences in the future, rather than to ascribe 
blame to any person.”52  To reinforce the ‘no blame’ approach, section 14B of the Act sets out 
restrictions on the disclosure and admissibility of certain investigation records. 
Further along the spectrum, the Coroners Act 2006 states that its purpose is:53 
…to help to prevent deaths and to promote justice through -  
(a)  investigations, and the identification of the causes and circumstances, of sudden or 
unexplained deaths, or deaths in special circumstances; and 
(b)  the making of specified recommendations or comments … that, if drawn to public 
attention, may reduce the chances of the occurrence of other deaths in circumstances 
similar to those in which those deaths occurred. 
 
The Coroners Act is also an example of legislation primarily aimed at identifying the 
cause of deaths, rather than attributing blame.  Persons can be compelled to provide 
information and police can search under warrants, however, there are grounds to refuse to 
provide information.  Section 127 provides for a limit on the use of the information obtained 
in particular its admission in court (except in relation to a crime of perjury or providing false 
information under the Coroner’s Act). 
 
In contrast to the ‘no blame’ approach, the HSW Act contains a power to compel 
information to be provided and specifically sets out the application of the Evidence Act.  
There is a clear intention to provide for a balancing of interests between the regulator and the 
regulated party in anticipation of litigation.  The Act provides that, for the purpose of 
performing any function of the regulator or an inspector under relevant health and safety 
legislation, any inspector may, at any reasonable time, enter any workplace and:54 
 
• require the PCBU or a person who is or appears to be in charge of the workplace to 
produce information relating to the work, the workplace, or the workers who work 
                                                     
52 Transport Accident Investigation Commission Act 1990, s 4 
53 Coroners Act 2006, s 3 
54 S 168 
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there; and the PCBU’s compliance with relevant health and safety legislation; and 
permit the inspector to examine and make copies of, or take extracts from, the 
information: and 
 
• require the PCBU or a person who is or appears to be in charge of the workplace to 
make or provide statements, in any form and manner that the inspector specifies. 
The Act specifically provides that this section does not affect the application of section 60 
of the Evidence Act 2006.  This is because the information obtained can be used in a criminal 
prosecution. 
The TAIC Act, Coroners Act, and HSW Act illustrate different approaches to achieving 
safety outcomes and show the different considerations that apply when you travel up the 
spectrum from full transparency and cooperation at one end of the spectrum to punitive 
enforcement at the other end.  Where the regulation is concerned with gathering information 
and identifying the cause of the accident, it is more likely to immunize the parties from 
criminal liability in return for obtaining the full story.  However, where the legislation 
includes deterrent measures, the parties will be motivated to protect themselves against 
liability.  In that case the legislation is likely to provide that they are not required to 
incriminate themselves.  This is consistent with both s 60 of the Evidence Act and the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990.55   
These statutes indicate the challenges in different approaches to managing information 
gathering for safety regulatory purposes.  It is clear that a significant challenge is to identify 
when it is more important to obtain as much information as possible and when the potential 
for punitive measures needs to be available.  This will always involve some form of balancing 
of rights and interests.  This is because information will only be freely and generously 
provided in an atmosphere of trust – which means that if regulators want information from 
participants that includes details of potentially unsafe practices, those participants will be 
likely to seek an undertaking of immunity before disclosing any details. 
The discussion above supports the view that when regulation includes criminal offence 
provisions, this has a pervading influence on the relationship between the parties.  This is 
likely to be the case with the HSW Act.  The fact that the new legislation contains harsher 
penalties than before is likely to strengthen the motivation of the regulated parties to limit 
potential liability by carefully managing the information they provide to the regulator.   
However, to operate effectively, the Act needs the parties to be engaging with each other 
and sharing information.  While the Act establishes a framework for regulating health and 
safety at work, the statutory duties are phrased in broad terms.  To create a further level of 
clarity and certainty, the implementation and operation of the Act requires subordinate 
                                                     
55 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23 
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regulatory instruments to be developed, including regulations, approved codes of practice and 
guidance documents.56 
The next section discusses the importance of having effective measures in place to ensure 
that the parties have a common understanding of the Act.  This is particularly important for 
enforcement through prosecution. 
IV  Need for clarity and certainty of meaning   
The Act is an example of a command and control framework in that it establishes legally 
enforceable duties and sets out tools that can be used to enforce those duties.  It is an example 
of instrumental regulation aimed at achieving a socially valuable goal, in this case, health and 
safety in the workplace. 57   
 Julia Black defines regulation as “the intentional use of authority to affect behaviour of a 
different party according to set standards, involving instruments of information gathering and 
behaviour modification”.58  However, a fundamental issue with this legislation is that, without 
further clarification, the term ‘health and safety’ may mean different things to different 
people.  In relation to the Australian Model Act, it has been noted that “… the scope of the 
Model Act is limited only by the imagination of those entrusted to interpret them and to 
enforce them”.59  
This is particularly relevant at the sharp-end of the enforcement spectrum with 
prosecution.  The Legislation Advisory Committee states, in relation to the creation of 
criminal offences in legislation, that: 60   
 
Legislation must precisely define the prohibited conduct. People must be able to act in 
certain ways, or decide not to act in certain ways, and have a clear understanding of the 
legal consequences that might follow. 
 
The LAC refers to the requirement in criminal proceedings, for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the physical act, and states that “an 
                                                     
56 Ss 211 - 228 
57 Fiona Haines, The Paradox of Regulation What Regulation Can Achieve and What it Cannot, (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham UK, Northhampton, MA, USA, 2011) at 10, 23;  
58 Black J (2001) ‘Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of regulations and Self-Regulation in a 
“Post-Regulatory” World’, Current Legal Problems, 54: 103-47, quoted in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and 
Martin Lodge The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (from Oxford Handbooks 
Onlinewww.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press 2015), Introduction: Regulation – The Field 
and the Developing Agenda, 6. 
59 Above n 9, at 3 
60  Above n 6, at 83 
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imprecise statement of the prohibited conduct may lead to inconsistent enforcement of the 
law, uncertain application of the law, unintended changes in behaviour, or an acquittal”. 61  
 
 Julia Black discusses the issues with the use of rules in any context and states that the 
three main problems are the tendency of rules to ‘over- or under-inclusiveness, their 
indeterminacy and their interpretation’. 62  She considers that the problems result from “the 
nature of rules and the nature of language… how we understand, interpret and apply rules 
depends in part on how we understand and interpret language.”63 
 
 The HSW Act duties cannot really be described as ‘under- or over-inclusive’ rather they 
are deliberately almost ‘all inclusive’ in that they apply to all ‘persons who conduct a business 
or undertaking’ and all workers.  While it may be tempting to say that this is an over-inclusive 
category, in fact the intention must be precisely to apply to all potential work arrangements 
and workplaces and to create a standard for all behavior in those contexts.  
 However, indeterminacy is potentially an issue.  Black states that all rules are inherently 
indeterminate.  She states:64 
Their indeterminacy matters because rules, particularly legal rules, are entrenched 
authoritative statements which are meant to guide behavior, be applied on an indefinite 
number of occasions, and which have sanctions attached for their breach.  It is thus 
important to know whether this particular occasion is one of those in which the rule should 
be applied.  
 This quote above is very similar to the words of the Legislation Advisory Committee in 
commenting on the importance of clear certain law when it comes to criminal enforcement.65  
Black states that a rule is only as good as its interpretation.  This reinforces the need for the 
law to mean the same thing to the relevant parties who must use it – the regulated party and 
the regulator who applies and enforces it.  Where parties share a judgment and understanding 
about what a rule means and when it applies, there is more likely to be compliance with the 
rule.  This reinforces the need for rules to be clear in relation to the behaviour they are seeking 
to influence.   
This is relevant not only to voluntary compliance but also enforcement.  This need for a 
common understanding is a particular challenge in the case of regulation such as health and 
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safety regulation.  The primary duty of care in the HSW Act is that a PCBU must ensure, so 
far as is reasonably practicable:66  
• the health and safety of workers who work for the PCBU while the workers are at 
work in the business or undertaking; and  
• the health and safety of workers whose activities in carrying out work are influenced 
or directed by the PCBU, while the workers are carrying out the work; and 
• that the health and safety of others is not put at risk from work carried out as part of 
the conduct of the business or undertaking. 
Many of the key terms in the Act are not defined.  It is understood that this approach has 
been deliberately taken to allow the plain meaning to prevail.    A specific example of this is 
in relation to the key term ‘risk’. 
In its Report on the Health and Safety Reform Bill, the Transport and Industrial Relations 
Select Committee recommended removing part of the definition of “hazard” and all of the 
definition of “risk” to encourage people to consider which risk means to them in their 
particular circumstances. 67  The definitions removed were linked and very similar with 
“hazard” meaning “a situation or thing that has the potential to cause death, injury, or illness 
to a person”; and “risk” meaning “the possibility that death, injury, or illness might occur 
when a person is exposed to a hazard.”68  
This is an interesting approach, particularly when you consider the implications for 
enforcement.  Section 30 of the Act states that a duty imposed on a person by or under the 
Act requires a person to eliminate risks to health and safety, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, and, if not, to minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable.  A 
person is required to comply with this duty ‘to the extent to which the person has, or 
would reasonably be expected to have, the ability to influence and control the matter to 
which the risks relate’.69 
As previously noted, for a criminal conviction, the prosecution must establish the 
elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.  By way of example, section 48 of the Act 
establishes an offence of failing to comply with duty that exposes individual to the risk of 
death or serious injury or serious illness.  The penalties, on conviction, range from $150,000 
(for an individual who is not a PCBU or an officer of a PCBU), to $1.5 million.   
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The defence to strict liability charge is that the defendant took all reasonably practicable 
steps.70  The issue of whether there was a risk or hazard and if so whether it was appropriately 
managed will be central to each party’s case in any prosecution.  In the case where the 
legislation leaves this open, this provides the opportunity for prolonged argument by the 
parties leading to complex time-consuming litigation.  It also makes any proactive education 
or guidance very difficult to develop. 
Two cases described below which were considered under the 1992 HSE Act provide 
examples of the fact specific nature of health and safety prosecutions and the capacity for 
words such as risk and hazard to be open to interpretation.  Both involved deaths from quad 
bike accidents where the regulator prosecuted the company in charge of the quad bike’s 
operation under the 1992 HSE Act for failure to take all practicable steps to ensure the safety 
of the deceased person. 
However, in the first case, involving the death of a tourist on a quad bike tour, the court found 
the defendants not guilty. 71  The court found that that the company was not required to 
completely eliminate risks, rather it was required to take reasonably practicable steps to 
minimise risks. 72  Applying this to the facts, the court found that the company had not failed 
in its duty under the Act.  The Court found that the regulator had wrongly formed the view 
that “…because harm has resulted, … it must be, “by default”, characterised as a “hazard”.”73  
The court stated that:74  
[The] understandable tendency [to use hindsight] must be resisted as it unjustifiably applies 
to the assessment of the existence of a hazard knowledge which, objectively, is not required 
by the Act of someone in the position of the defendant company. 
By way of contrast, in March 2014, a share milking company was convicted and fined 
$28,125 and ordered to pay reparations of $75,000 after a farm hand died when the quad bike 
he was riding rolled on top of him.  In the media release on this issue, WorkSafe’s chief 
investigator said the company could have done more to protect the farm hand.  He stated: 75  
 
The area he was riding in had been identified as a hazard, but the company had not taken 
any action to tell its workers not to ride quad bikes there, or in other hazardous areas. 
For the parties to develop a common understanding of duties, and to implement effective 
responsive enforcement, there needs to be a regulatory ‘conversation’, that is, an on-going 
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relationship between regulator and regulated party where information is shared and relevant 
issues are discussed.76  Prosecution it is both harsh and adversarial in nature and the threat of 
prosecution has the potential to create a pervading atmosphere of distrust.  The distrust 
created by the threat of prosecution may also limit the capacity of the regulator to use other 
compliance and enforcement tools.   
This leads me to the view that there is an internal paradox in the HSW Act.  The Act 
establishes high level duties that need to be further clarified and explained by the regulator to 
provide the desired level of regulatory certainty.  The regulator needs to gather relevant and 
useful information to develop guidance and subordinate regulatory instruments.  This is best 
achieved through an open and transparent conversation with the regulated parties.  However, 
because the Act provides that a breach of those duties is a criminal offence, this is likely to 
create distrust and a lack of openness.  A regulatory instrument which operates as a threat may 
inhibit the open sharing of information for guidance and education. 
Where the terms used to describe key duties and offences in the Act are capable of more 
than one interpretation or are so general that they encompass a broad range of possible 
behavior, there is a risk that regulators may seek to go too far in their regulatory decisions, 
seeking to enforce compliance with the ‘spirit of the law’ or seeking to penalize an operator 
for its ‘attitude to compliance’ rather than enforcing rules that are objectively agreed to apply.   
While it is tempting to consider that the underlying purpose of the law should be 
enforced, in our legal system, the plain meaning of legally enforceable rules will apply.  The 
purpose is relevant but only to the extent that this informs the plain meaning – it cannot 
replace or override this meaning.77  The courts also serve a purpose here – which is to keep a 
check on over-zealous enforcement. 
The problem with courts taking on the role of ‘fleshing out’ framework regulation is that 
courts cannot make binding broad policy or operational statements.  Courts can only decide 
the facts in front of them.    
It is arguable that Black’s concept of ‘regulatory conversations’ that Morgan and Yeung 
refer to is what is envisaged with the HSW Act. Julia Black discusses the situation where the 
conversation between the regulator and regulated parties may be a consciously adopted 
regulatory approach where: 78 
the regulator may issue only very broad rules, anticipating that it will then engage in a 
process of negotiation, a conversation, with individual regulatees as to how those broad 
rules will apply to those circumstances, including perhaps the approval of rules written by 
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the firm or individual to guide its own behavior in compliance with the generally applicable 
norm.  
However there are significant risks in having regulator and regulated party effectively 
‘agree’ on what the duties are.  This is particularly the case where third parties may be 
significantly adversely affected – for example where there is the potential for injury or death.  
The Independent Taskforce recommended addressing this through having a tripartite 
instrument which it described in the following way: 79 
The internationally recognised model of engagement for workplace health and safety that is 
at the heart of the ‘Robens’ model described in a landmark 1972 British report by Lord 
Robens.  Tripartism involves three key parties – employers, workers and the regulator – 
each playing critical, interdependent roles and assuming particular responsibilities in 
relation to each other.  
The HSW Act has elements of tripartism in providing for worker participation in some 
workplaces 80 and for engagement by regulators with parties who may be affected.81  
However, the extent to which there will be meaningful input by all potentially affected 
parties, including, for example partners, parents and children of those who are injured or 
killed, remains to be seen.  The capacity for third parties to take private prosecutions may go 
some way toward filling this gap and this is discussed further later in this paper. 82 
 
V Potential deterrent effect of harsher penalties 
 
 In the Pike River case, the Court made the decision to consider the failures as a set of 
cumulative failures to address what was considered to be inadequate fines available under the 
legislation at the time.  In doing so, Farish J made some significant statements regarding the 
purpose of sentencing in health and safety cases:83 
 
The sentencing exercise today is to denounce and deter the breaches under the Act and also 
in some way hold accountable the company for its breaching and its lack of obligations to 
its employees and DCR Department of Labour v Pike River Coal Ltd 33 contractors. This 
last factor is of significant importance to the families of the men who died and is repeated 
by them in their victim impact reports. They have a sense that no one has been held to 
account for their loss and that no one has apologised to them for the significant breaches of 
the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992.   
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… 
Here the informant submitted that a concurrent fine in the sum of $250,000 which was the 
maximum penalty in relation to any one of the informations would be inadequate to 
denounce and deter but also to reflect the overall culpability of the many failings here of 
the company. The informant submitted that the Court would be justified and entitled to 
impose cumulative fines in relation to those four discreet areas. That was the gas control 
management, ventilation control management, panel geology and the explosion mitigation 
management. The Court agreed with the informant. A single fine of under $250,000 would 
be woefully inadequate. 
 One of the questions for this paper is whether harsher penalties would have made any 
difference. 
 
A Issues with harsher penalties 
 
As noted above, the new HSW Act includes much harsher offence provisions.  The 
question is whether this will work in practice to mean more effective compliance with the 
purposes of the Act.  Writing some years prior to the development of the Australian Model 
Act, Richard Johnstone  stated:84 
It is now well accepted that the purpose of OHS prosecutions is deterrence, particularly 
general deterrence. OHS regulators are increasingly looking for a more strategic use of 
prosecution, as a means to reinforce and support measures to encourage voluntary 
compliance by duty holders.  Recent regulatory theory positing an “enforcement pyramid” 
in which regulators seek to promote voluntary compliance with benign measures such as 
advice and persuasion in the shadow of “big sticks” (or the “benign big gun”) of 
prosecution, relies heavily on the deterrent effect of prosecution at the top of the pyramid.  
Deterrence theory holds that penalties for OHS contraventions should be high enough to 
induce duty holders to make rational judgments that the cost of non-compliance based on 
the perceived likelihood of detection and the severity of the penalty outweighs the benefits 
of non-compliance.  Low levels of fines will render a deterrence-based enforcement regime 
ineffective. 
The views expressed by Johnstone appear to be strongly reflected in the design of the 
Model Act and the new HSW Act.  Increasing the fines is aimed at preventing behaviour by 
the least compliant actors who may have considered a fine under the 1992 Act as a ‘cost of 
doing business’ which was not sufficient to provoke a change in behaviour.  However, it 
remains to be seen whether it will work in the New Zealand context.  Relevant issues include 
how the courts will respond to the higher penalties and how the threat of prosecution may 
affect the regulator’s exercise of its other functions under the Act.  
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The Royal Commission report stated that “Penalties must deter potential offenders and 
ensure that health and safety obligations are taken seriously.” The Report quoted a submission 
which advocated that the range of punishments ‘must be sufficient to cause discomfort’.85 
 
This deterrent effect of penalties is echoed in the lead sentencing decision under the 1992 
HSE Act, where a full bench of the High Court set out key guiding factors for sentencing for 
health and safety offences. 86  Key factors for the purpose of this paper were emphasis on 
reparation and the creation of bands of potential fines assessed by culpability.   
 
Compliance theorists consider that the deterrent effect of harsher penalties is likely to 
differ depending on the nature of the regulated party.  Gunningham discusses the arguments in 
favour of deterrence by those who believe that regulated business corporations will only be 
motivated to commit resource to meeting socially valuable goals when required to do so by 
law and where they fear harsh penalties.87  He states that “On this view, the certainty and 
severity of penalties must be such that it is not economically rational to defy the law.” 
 
However Gunningham goes on to refer to Haines’ view that deterrence may be more 
effective in influencing the behaviour of small and medium-sized enterprises due to their size 
and simpler management structure. 88  However his view is “The size of the penalty may also 
be an important consideration: mega penalties tend to penetrate corporate consciousness in a 
way that other penalties do not.89 
 
B Potential responses  
 
i. Attitude of the courts  
 
There are a number of practical implications with the harsher potential penalties in the 
new Act.  The first issue is whether the courts will in fact order these higher penalties.  Many 
of the offences in the Act are strict liability offences and it remains to be seen whether there is 
an element of resistance by judges and juries to imposing significant fines for offences which 
do not require intent to be established, or that may be seen more as employment matters.    
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The Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines reinforce that, in creating criminal offences, 
the usual case is to require the prosecution to establish the mental element of an offence 
beyond reasonable doubt. There are some cases, however, where it is considered appropriate 
for policy or practical reasons to “shift the burden of proof” from the prosecution to the 
defence.   The Committee states that:90 
A common example is strict liability offences in which the prosecution must prove the 
physical element, but not the mental element, of an offence. The defendant must prove an 
absence of fault on the lesser standard of the balance of probabilities. 
The Committee further states that: 
 
Strict liability offences are commonly used in the regulatory context and may be 
appropriate where:  
 
• the offence involves the protection of the public, or a group such as employees, from 
those who voluntarily undertake risk-creating activities;  
 
• there is a need to incentivise people who undertake those activities to adopt 
appropriate precautions to prevent breaches;  
• the defendant is best placed to establish absence of fault because of matters primarily 
within their knowledge.  
A leading authority on public welfare regulatory offences is the Court of Appeal case of Civil 
Aviation Department v MacKenzie which involved a prosecution of an offence, under s 24 of 
the Civil Aviation Act 1964, of operating an aircraft in such a manner as to be the cause of 
unnecessary danger to persons and property.91  The question before the Court was: “Whether 
the onus of establishing absence of fault as a defence to a charge in respect of public welfare 
regulatory offending should rest on the defendant”. 
 The Court considered that “…in the case of public welfare regulatory offences … a 
defence of total absence of fault is available unless clearly excluded in terms of the 
legislation”, and “…the onus of proving such a defence to the balance of probabilities 
standard rests on the defendant.”  
 Two key statements made by the court were: 
[I]t is artificial to speak in terms of mens rea. Liability under legislation of this kind rarely 
turns on the presence or absence of any particular state of mind. But in social policy terms 
compliance with an objective standard of conduct is highly relevant. Courts must be able to 
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accord sufficient weight to the promotion of public health and safety without at the same 
time snaring the diligent and socially responsible. 
 and 
 [T]he defendant will ordinarily know far better than the prosecution how the breach 
occurred and what he had done to avoid it. In so far as the emphasis in public welfare 
regulations is on the protection of the interests of society as a whole, it is not unreasonable 
to require a defendant to bear the burden of proving that the breach occurred without fault 
on his part.  
In terms of quantum, there may be a tendency for courts to consider strict liability 
offences to be ‘less criminal’ in nature and accordingly penalties for strict liability 
offences may be lower than those for other criminal offences.92   
By way of a possible example, in recent weeks, a jury is reported to have delivered a not 
guilty verdict in relation to a manslaughter charge in a forestry death. 93   In what was 
considered to be a landmark case, police filed charges under the Crimes Act 1961 alleging 
reckless disregard for safety.  While both the contracting company and the forestry operator 
also pleaded guilty to health and safety charges, the more serious manslaughter charge was 
successfully defended by the individual forestry operator charged.  He will be sentenced for 
the health and safety charge, however his company is in liquidation and cannot therefore be 
sentenced.   
 
This case may indicate that a conviction may be more difficult to obtain (at least in the 
case of a jury trial) in relation to health and safety matters (although it may equally be 
considered an argument in favour of strict liability in cases where there is a strong public 
safety purpose but intent is likely to be difficult to establish).  The case may also be 
illustrative of another point - that defendants are more likely to defend more serious charges, 
increasing the cost and resource requirements of prosecuting where the penalties are 
potentially higher. 
 
Finally the case also illustrates a key practical challenge in health and safety enforcement 
which is the ability of a defendant company to wind up leaving, in some cases, no-one to take 
the blame or pay any penalties.   
 
ii. Potential to prolong litigation  
 
As noted above, the potential for much higher penalties or imprisonment, while aimed at 
deterring behaviour, may, in fact, result in a much harder ‘fight’ in terms of enforcement, 
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creating longer and more costly litigation.   This could be seen as doing nothing to advance 
the goal of the legislation which is to make workers and workplaces safer and healthier and   
using up time and money that could be spent on promoting compliance by other means. 
 
As I have already discussed, the threat of prosecution may also inhibit cooperative 
behavior by currently compliant regulated parties who may seek to minimize their potential 
exposure to legal liability and who may also start to resent and reconsider investing in safety 
practices when other less law abiding or competent operators are seen to be ‘getting away 
with it’.94  This reinforces the general deterrent aspect of punitive sanctions.  Gunninham 
refers to research that found that “…hearing about legal sanctions against other firms prompts 
many of them to review, and often take further action to strengthen, their own firm’s 
compliance programme.”95 
 
The research in this area indicates that using harsher penalties may work well to achieve 
the regulatory goals.  However the use of prosecution for this purpose needs to be done 
strategically.  The best scenario is a successful prosecution with a high penalty that is capable 
of sending a clear specific and general deterrent message. In practice, however, the outcome 
of prosecution is not always easy to predict with key relevant factors being limited resources 
for the regulator, whether the charges are defended and whether it is a judge or jury making 
the decision.  The outcome is also highly fact specific and dependent on whether the 
defendant is a company (which may wind up) and whether the defendant has the financial 
means to pay reparation or a fine.  
While it remains to be seen what practical implications do occur from the inclusion of 
harsher penalties in the legislation, the discussion above points to a need for regulators to 
develop policies to guide them in deciding how to encourage and enforce regulation, 
including if, and when, to prosecute.  The next part looks at regulatory theory in terms of 
encouraging and enforcing compliance. 
VI Compliance and enforcement policies 
 
A  Responsive regulation - the compliance triangle 
 
As noted above, both the Royal Commission and the Taskforce advocated the use of a 
responsive approach to health and safety regulation following Pike River.96  The Act sets out 
a range of tools for regulators to encourage and enforce compliance.  The previous section 
discussed how important it is for parties to clearly understand what their duties are and what 
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the consequence of their actions may be.  This section discussed the way that regulators and 
others may respond to non-compliance under the Act. 
Earlier in this paper, I described the ‘no-blame’ approach focused on obtaining 
information on the cause of accidents and incidents in order to prevent them happening again.  
However it is clear that this is only suitable in some situations and the approach in the HSW 
Act is to provide for a range of potential measures to encourage and enforce compliance.   
Many regulators choose to have a policy as to how they will strategically use these measures 
and this is the approach that is anticipated with the HSW Act.    
The Act provides for prosecutions, but also includes other enforcement tools, and the 
purpose indicates that compliance with the Act will be secured through selecting effective and 
appropriate compliance and enforcement measures.  Regulators must also publish information 
about their approach to compliance.   
The responsive compliance model, which links the reaction of the regulator to the 
behaviour of the regulated party and advocates selecting the appropriate tool from a range of 
measures aimed at encouraging and enforcing compliance, was proposed by Ian Ayres and 
John Braithwaite in their book "Responsive Regulation: Transcending the deregulation 
debate"97 which built on earlier work by John Scholz.98   This approach looks at the overall 
compliance and enforcement spectrum – rather than dealing with enforcement as the separate 
and ‘sharp end’ of the regulator’s roles.  
Scholz advocated an approach which has been described as ‘tit for tat’ where cooperative 
behaviour was rewarded by the regulator holding off on using a deterrent approach but, when 
cooperation ended, the regulator would switch to punishment using a deterrent approach.   
Ayres and Braithwaite argued for an enforcement pyramid with the regulator’s enforcement 
response progressing up the pyramid using increasingly punitive strategies.   
Ayres and Braithwaite state that:99 
Escalation up this pyramid gives the state greater capacity to enforce compliance but at the cost of 
increasingly inflexible and adversarial regulation…The key contention of this regulatory theory is 
that the existence of the gradients and peaks of the two enforcement pyramids channels most the 
regulatory action to the base of the pyramid – in the realms of persuasion and self-regulation.  
The irony proposed as that the existence and signalling of the capacity to get tough as needed can 
usher in a regulatory climate that is more voluntaristic and nonlitigious than when the state rules 
out adversariness and punitiveness as an option. 
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In the case of health and safety regulation, Australian and New Zealand approaches 
currently vary, with some regulators publishing their prosecution policy100 and others 
adopting a compliance and enforcement policy, such as the Australian National Compliance 
and Enforcement Policy (NECP) published by Safe Work Australia which is set out below.101  
The ‘compliance pyramid’ approach based on Ayres and Braithwaite and others is influential 
with regulators opting for an approach where they state they will select one or more from a 
range of ‘tools’ aimed at reinforcing willing compliance and only using the prosecution as a 
final resort or in very serious situations.   
 
The NECP uses the traditional triangle shape with different potential enforcement tools 
set out.  The diagram does not necessarily require an escalating approach to enforcement, that 
is, it is not necessary to start at the bottom of the triangle and to progressively adopt more 
significant responses.  Rather, the approach depicted in the diagram allows for a response at 
any level in the triangle (including at the top) to be used in the first instance if this is 
considered most appropriate after considering factors such as the extent or risk of harm, 
conduct, public interest and attitude to compliance.  However, it does note that using tools 
lower down the triangle may avoid the need to escalate. 
 
The HSW Act acknowledges that regulators may have powers under overlapping 
legislative regimes and requires that this is specifically addressed in their compliance and 
enforcement policies.102 The Australian NECP states: 103 
 
Regulators will commence their intervention using the tools that are most appropriate in the 
particular circumstances. Some tools, as indicated in this policy, are alternatives while 
others may be used in combination. Using a range of tools in the lower levels of the 
pyramid may often achieve compliance without needing to escalate to the more serious 
levels of sanctions.”   
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The ‘compliance pyramid’ is intended to encourage an interactive co-operative approach.  
However, I would argue that, at the point at which prosecution becomes a realistic option, this 
co-operation breaks down.  Where regulators wish to preserve the possibility of prosecution, 
the situation moves to one of gathering evidence, hiring lawyers, and minimizing 
communication.  The parties are no longer interested in a joined-up approach to achieving the 
overall spirit of the regulation.  Rather, the parties will be seeking to develop a clear 
understanding of the rules to be objectively interpreted and proved in court if necessary.  
Regulated parties will be concerned to guard information where the release of it may 
adversely impact on them. 
Therefore, where parties can face significant fines or imprisonment for failure to comply 
with regulatory requirements, the parties’ focus is likely to move from broad regulatory 
concepts to requirements for certainty and compliance with criminal procedure. 
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B Enforcing the spirit of the law vs the letter of the law 
 
As noted above, the use of the compliance pyramid approach seems to change if 
prosecution is a possibility.  An issue that is often raised is the matters taken into account in 
determining which compliance tool to use and whether regulators are sometimes attempting to 
enforce the spirit (rather than the letter) of the law.  This is linked to the view that operators 
sometimes seek to creatively comply with the law, by complying in a formulaic way which 
can be argued to circumvent the underlying purpose of the law.  As is noted earlier in this 
paper, to achieve regulatory goals both parties need to have clarity and certainty as to the 
meaning of the law, particularly in command and control regulation where this is enforceable 
through prosecution or where regulators can make decisions that directly impact a party’s 
livelihood.   
If enforceable obligations are to be imposed upon people and to have the force of law, 
then these obligations need to be sufficiently clear to the parties concerned.  Where there is a 
disconnect between the plain wording of a rule and the ‘underlying spirit of the law’, it is 
unlikely that a regulator could seek to claim wrongdoing by a party who had complied with 
his or her legal obligation – even if they have done this in a formulaic and opportunistic way.  
While law changes can seek to change attitudes, command and control regulation is more 
suited to controlling actions, rather than underlying motivations. 
Ayres and Braithwaite’s approach has been criticized for advocating an approach where 
regulators reward co-operation and willingness to comply and punish recalcitrant operators.  
Yeung calls this a ‘potentially dangerous weakness’ that fails to take into account the right for 
people to act as they wish provided that it is not unlawful. 104  She also strongly criticises the 
approach whereby the severity of the enforcement response is determined by reference to the 
degree of co-operation by the regulated party.    Yeung refers to the “constitutional values of 
proportionality and consistency which should restrict the extent to which the regulation’s 
instrumentalist enterprise may legitimately to pursued”.105   She states that these values: 106  
…suggest that, while regulatory officials should employ the enforcement tool most likely 
to be effective in securing compliance, that choice should also be informed by the desired 
social purpose(s) sought to be promoted, subject to the requirement that the choice of 
instrument constitutes a fair and proportionate response to the seriousness of the alleged 
response.  
The theory of responsive regulation places prosecution at or near the ‘top of the pyramid’ 
suggesting that this response should be used least often and in the most serious case.  There 
are many reasons for this including the highly punitive nature of prosecution, with criminal 
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conviction potentially resulting in significant monetary fines or imprisonment as well as 
public denouncement and a criminal record (which in some cases makes the holder ineligible 
for certain privileges).  In addition to the impact on the defendants, prosecution is a costly 
exercise which ties up the resources of the regulator and the court system.  It can also have a 
significant impact on other parties such as witnesses and juries who must also give up their 
time and take a significant amount of time to resolve.    
C Responsive regulation in context 
 (i) The ‘split pyramid’ 
Although Johnstone referred to the enforcement pyramid in his 2003 comments,107 in a 
2012 text on the Australian Model Law after it had been passed, the authors have a different 
view.  They provide state that the NECP professes to take a ‘responsive’ approach to 
enforcement but that “This approach should not be confused with the ‘responsive’ model of 
enforcement proposed by a number of theorists, most notably by Ayres and Braithwaite.”108  
They state that, in practice, a responsive approach will have a more restricted meaning:109  
…which will involve the regulator choosing the optimal sanction from the hierarchy 
of sanctions, based on: the extent to which the firm’s work health and safety compliance 
falls short of the level required by work health and safety standards; the resulting level of 
risk to workers and others; the firm’s attitude and level of co-operation; and the firm’s prior 
compliance record. 
Johnstone and Toomey also note that there is little evidence that a ‘tit for tat’ approach is 
taken by health and safety inspectors in Australia.  They consider that inspectors take a ‘one-
off’ proportional response in most instances.  Notably, they state that:110 
In practice it is rare for a fatal incident or serious injury to escape prosecution no matter 
how proactive the duty holder.  Conversely, it is rare for a contravention that does not 
result in an incident, or that finds expression in a minor incident , to lead to prosecution, 
regardless of the seriousness of the risk underlying the incidence or the belligerence of the 
duty holder. 
Johnstone and Toomey describe the approach set out above as an escalation based on the 
seriousness of the actual consequences.  They note that Gunningham and Johnstone refer to 
this approach as the ‘split pyramid’ and state that this split of enforcement responses fails to 
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use the dynamic benefits that the enforcement pyramid can offer and does not provide for an 
escalating approach to compliance.111 
In practice the predictable ‘split pyramid’ approach outlined above could result in 
complaisance by regulated parties.  If it is the case that harsh enforcement tools are always 
used where there is a serious outcome and rarely in other cases, then this limits the capacity of 
regulators to deter unsafe behavior at an early stage before it becomes a significant problem 
and becomes merely a matter of responding to serious incidents when they occur – in other 
words enforcement becomes the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff.   
ii Regulatory design features affecting enforcement 
As Morgan and Yeung note, in considering approaches to enforcement, two features of 
the regulatory framework are particularly relevant, these are the standard of liability and the 
role of public or private enforcement. 112   In my view these matters are linked both in the 
regulatory design and in the practical application of the HSW Act.    
Morgan and Yeung provide a view on the different characteristics of criminal and civil 
law.  Their view is that: 113  
…criminal law places more emphasis on the actor’s subjective intent, imposes higher evidentiary 
requirements in order to prove that a violation has occurred, involves enforcement by a public 
official and is intended to censure and punish those who violate the law.…[b]y contrast, civil law 
traditionally involves less emphasis on the actor’s subjective intent, imposes lower evidentiary 
requirements in order to establish contravention, may be enforced through litigation by private 
parties and aims to compensate or restore the damage caused by the legal contravention. 
In considering these elements against the offence regime set out in the HSW Act, it is 
clear that, in practice, it falls somewhere in the middle of these categories.  The offence 
provisions in the Act set out criminal offences that are subject to penalties on conviction of 
fines and/or imprisonment.  However as noted earlier most of the offences are strict liability 
offences and the Act provides for private prosecutions where the regulator decides not to file 
charges under the HSW Act (or another relevant Act).  The Sentencing Act and prevailing 
case law under the previous HSE Act 1992 gives priority on sentencing to reparation and 
Sentencing Act criteria have recently been amended to allow for higher reparation payments 
allowing for a ‘top up’ to ACC compensation for earnings.114   
This provides the capacity for prosecutions under the HSW Act to be taken between 
private parties and with a significant objective being compensation to the victim.  This creates 
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a situation where the criminal law is capable of being used as a replacement for the civil law 
and for essentially the same purposes.  The discussion in the next section shows that this was 
not the intention when private prosecutions were provided for.  It also emphasises the fact that 
regulatory instruments usually operation as part of a relevant broader regulatory context. 
VII The impact of private prosecutions  
As I have noted, prosecution is one of the enforcement tools available to regulators under 
the HSW Act.  This tool is also available to private individuals in the event that the regulator 
decides not to prosecute.   
The HSE Act was amended in 2002 to enable third parties to initiate prosecutions.115  Prior to 
that, prosecutions under the Act could only be brought by a health and safety inspector.  The 
Select Committee considering the proposed amendment stated:116  
There are a number of reasons for removing the Crown’s monopoly on prosecutions. 
These include enhancing the deterrent effect of enabling a greater range of persons to 
enforce the Act; providing an alternative means of seeking justice for aggrieved parties 
where a case is not prosecuted by OSH; and providing a safeguard against potential 
inertia, incompetence or biased reasoning. 
The Select Committee noted that it had been advised by the Department of Labour that 
there were robust safeguards surrounding private prosecutions which “protect against 
inappropriate litigation”. The Select Committee went on to note that “… the provisions of 
the Sentencing Act reduce incentives to take private prosecutions for financial gain 
because victims can no longer be awarded part of a fine.”117 
However recent developments in sentencing may have changed this in a significant way.  
In December 2014, section 32 of the Sentencing Act was amended to permit a court to order 
reparation for consequential loss where compensation has not been paid under the Accident 
Compensation Act 2001.  This specifically permits reparation for consequential loss or 
damage “to meet any statutory shortfall in compensation.”118  This effectively permits ACC 
compensation to be ‘topped up’.  Prior to that, under the Sentencing Act, and in accordance 
with the Supreme Court case of Davies,119 the position had been that reparation could not be 
awarded for matters where compensation was payable (regardless of the amount actually 
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paid) on the grounds that to do so would undermine the “social contract” underpinning the 
national accident compensation scheme. 120 
This amendment came into force at the beginning of 2015.121  It has been described by at 
least one commentator as a potential ‘return to personal injury damages claims’.122  This is 
particularly the case where private individuals can initiate the prosecution.  Although, equally, 
this development could also result in increased pressure by victims for regulators to prosecute.  
The potential for higher awards of reparation could also means that there is increased 
resistance to liability by defendants, with more choosing to aggressively defend health and 
safety charges. 
This capacity for private prosecutions has been continued in the HSW Act.  The section is 
not limited in who can prosecute which leaves it open to interested parties such as unions if 
they have notified their interest with the regulator.123   
Prosecution under the HSW Act enables victims to actively enforce the Act.  Their 
decisions can be quite independent of any strategy the regulator may have and may be used as 
a vehicle for achieving compensation for specific loss that they have incurred.  This has come 
about because of law changes since private prosecutions were first introduced in 2003 and 
may have ‘moved the goal posts’ in terms of the overall regulatory playing field.  This 
incentive could result in either the victim (or other parties) influencing the regulator’s 
enforcement decision in favour of prosecution (rather than other tools), or taking a 
prosecution of their own.  This adds an element of unpredictability to the choice of 
enforcement tool and raises a question about the ability for regulators to apply an enforcement 
policy effectively.  It also raises real questions for other issues which are outside the scope of 
this paper such as the potential for a backdoor means of ‘suing for personal injury’ and 
inequalities in terms of financial compensation for accident victims between those who are 
‘lucky’ enough to be injured at work and successfully prosecute and receive reparation and 
those who are not. 
However, private enforcement is considered to add value to a regulatory regime.  In 
addition to providing a means for the private actors to receive compensation, it is considered 
by Yeung to be a ‘participatory activity which allows individuals and groups to compete over 
increasingly pluralistic understandings of the public interest’.124 
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The number of private prosecutions is increasing.  While the amendment was made in 
2003, it was not until 2012 that a private prosecution was successfully brought to Court.125  
The first successful private prosecution was taken by the NZ Meat Workers Union in 2012.126    
The second case was in 2014 and was brought by Sergeant Stevin Creeggan against the 
New Zealand Defence Force who plead guilty to health and safety failures which led to the 
deaths of three men in a 2010 military helicopter crash127. 
The Court in addressing Mr Creeggan stated:128   
You are proof that one person can make a difference. By dint of your tenacity and 
resolve, you have managed to create a silver lining from an unimaginable tragedy that 
has seared itself into the nation’s psyche. You have demonstrated what the amendment 
legislation permitting private prosecutions set out to achieve. 
However, in the month of August 2015 alone, three private prosecutions are reported 
to have been determined.   
 
On 3 August 2015, a guilty plea was entered in a case taken by the CTU for the death of 
forestry worker Charles Finlay.  On 12August, 2015 in another case taken by the CTU, Puketi 
Logging, the employers of 19 year old forestry worker Eramiha Pairama, were found guilty of 
a charge under the Health and Safety in Employment Act relating to his death in 2013.129  
Following that, on 31 August 2015, Otago University pleaded guilty to a private health and 
safety prosecution and paid $60,000 to a woman visitor who slipped on wet tiles.130 
 
It is not possible at this stage to state whether this is a trend.  However, clearly the 
potential for private prosecutions indicates that parties other than the regulator can make 
enforcement decisions under health and safety legislation (albeit once certain conditions are 
met).   
 
It is not possible to draw on the Australian experience in relation to private prosecutions 
as the Australian Model Law does not provide for private prosecutions.  Although, in their 
text, Johnstone and Tooma strongly advocate for: “…a general third-party right to initiate 
prosecutions, exercisable by a union, an NGO (such as a worker’ health action group or an 
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institute concerned with the protection of workers’ rights), a competitor, or a group of 
workers”. 131    
The inclusion of the right for a competitor is explained by reference to the way that laws 
concerned with food health and safety standards and consumer protection are most effectively 
enforced.  Johnstone and Tooma state that:132 
Competitors have the greatest interest in ensuring that competing businesses do not get an 
unfair price advantage by cutting health and safety corners and therefore will use the full 
extent of their commercial resources to enforce legal obligations against their competitors.  
It is the application of this motivation that will act as the greatest deterrent for breaches of 
the legislation. 
With respect to this point of view, the same issues arise as with private prosecution by 
victims which is that this would have the potential to ‘skew’ the application of any overall 
enforcement policy by having some prosecutions that occur, not because they fit with an 
overall strategy for health and safety generally but because there is a private interest strong 
enough to motivate a private prosecution.   
Again, it is noted that there are valuable reasons why these prosecutions should occur – 
however what is important is that the capacity for these prosecutions to occur or to influence 
regulator decision-making needs to be actively taken into account in terms of the overall 
regulatory design.  If these influences are not taken into account and built into the system, 
lawmakers and regulators will be caught out and left wondering why the planned outcomes 
did not occur. 
VIII Alternatives to prosecution 
The Act does include alternatives to prosecution, including the ability for the regulator to 
issue improvement and prohibition notices and to accept enforceable undertakings from the 
PCBU.133  However the remedy for failure to comply with these notices is enforcement 
through prosecution.  Regulations can also be made prescribing infringement offences – 
providing for a lesser penalty and quicker enforcement process.134   
In addition, the Act provides for regulations to be made prescribing a requirement for 
specified work, products, or qualifications to be authorised by the regulator.  This operates as 
a type of control of entry and exit into the market in an instrument that in other respects is 
open entry.   
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By way of contrast, some other forms of safety regulation establish licensing or 
certification regimes designed to control entry and exit by all operators and to establish 
criteria that must be met in order to remain a participant.  Examples include land transport 
safety management which requires drivers to be licensed and vehicles to be registered and 
have a current warrant of fitness. 135 
While the driver licensing regime requires drivers to be a certain age, have passed written 
and practical tests and to have met standards for eyesight (and some other health related 
criteria), some other regimes go further and include more comprehensive requirements such 
as a requirement to be a ‘fit and proper person’, which often requires consideration of the 
person’s criminal history and possibly also character references or declarations of 
compliance.136  Examples of these regimes include maritime documents issued under the 
Maritime Transport Act, including Maritime Rule Part 19 which establishes the Maritime 
Operator Safety System (MOSS).137    
Features of licensing regimes include the fact that they require an ongoing relationship 
between the regulator and the regulated parties and they provide a range of tools which the 
regulator can use to respond to concerns and incidents.  These tools are included in typical 
‘compliance pyramids’.  In many cases these models provide the regulator with the power to 
impose conditions on the operation of the licence, or to operate or to suspend or revoke it 
(after following an appropriate process).138  They may also provide the ability for the regulator 
to ban the operator from re-entry as an industry participant, either for a specific period of time 
or potentially permanently.   
Licensing regimes that include a ‘fit and proper person’ requirement or that require a 
criminal or compliance history check as a condition of holding a licence may also result in 
operators with poor compliance or safety histories being excluded as operators.139  This is 
arguably the most significant deterrent for an operator as it directly affects their livelihood in 
a manner that other enforcement tools may not. 
Because these regimes necessitate and create a close working relationship, they facilitate 
information exchange and the on-going relationship necessary for a compliance dialogue to 
take place.  However they are also potentially vulnerable to capture resulting from the close 
working relationship between industry and the regulator and tend also to be very resource 
intensive. 
In terms of encouraging compliance, licensing regimes arguably allow for a greater range 
of compliance tools to be used meaning that the response can be more closely tailored to the 
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issue than where prosecution is the main form of enforcement.  In addition, the ability for an 
ongoing dialogue allowing the regulator to both ‘negotiate compliance’ with individual 
operators and send clear messages to other operators has the potential for good compliance 
outcomes.  However, where there is ultimately a punitive outcome – this may create similar 
issues of distrust and self-preservation that exist in a model where prosecution is the main 
means of punishment.  The potential for judicial review of a regulator’s decision also means 
that this model would not avoid the court system. 
IX Practical issues with prosecutions 
In health and safety prosecutions, the individual circumstances and responses of the 
defendants and the victims can vary markedly.  Key influencing factors include the fact that 
the defendants can range from large well-resourced corporations with healthy finances who 
are well insured and confident participants in the legal process, to small companies or 
individuals who are overwhelmed by the process and by the fact that they have become part 
of a distressing (and in some cases tragic) situation.   
Prosecutions are heavily influenced by the way in which defendants are legally 
represented.  This can range from those with a large expensive team of lawyers and experts to 
defendants who, by choice or necessity, are self-represented.  Both of these raise potential 
complexities in terms of time and cost to regulators and increase the unpredictability of the 
outcome.  It appears that the number of self-represented defendants is increasing.140  In some 
cases the defendants themselves are also suffering significant emotional stress as a result of 
the accident that led them to be prosecuted.   
Even if a prosecution is successful, the sentence is established by reference to the 
financial means of the defendant, meaning the outcomes in similar cases do not necessarily 
reflect the facts or principles at issue.141  In other words, there is not necessarily a direct 
correlation between the gravity of the fact situation and the penalty – as this must in all cases 
take into account issues that are specific to the case.  This makes it even more difficult to send 
a clear message to the public at large based on the outcome of a specific prosecution. 
While the regulatory reform leading to the HSW Act follows the Pike River Royal 
Commission recommendation, it is interesting to note that, in the case of the Pike River 
tragedy, the company was reported to have been prosecuted and convicted in July 2013 
without the company taking part in any of the proceedings.  It was fined $720,000 (this was 
by identifying a number of failings and fining each one - as the maximum fine for the charge 
laid was $250,000), and ordered to pay $3,410,000 in reparation ($110,000 for each man – the 
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29 who died and the 2 survivors).  However, by that time the company was in receivership 
and therefore it was extremely unlikely any money would be paid142.   
 
Charges had also been laid against Peter Whittall, chief executive of the company on the 
grounds that, as an officer, he acquiesced or participated in the company’s failures.  Mr 
Whittall pleaded not guilty and successfully moved the proceedings to Wellington.  The 
likelihood was that there would be a very long, expensive trial with no certainty of outcome.  
Then, in what was reported as a controversial decision, in December 2013, the charges were 
withdrawn and the full amount paid as a ‘voluntary payment’.143 
 
This clearly illustrates the complexities of the issues around prosecution – the cost, time, 
frustration and mixed messages inherent in the process.  It is also ironic that higher penalties 
would not have made any difference.  However, the question remains whether the victims and 
their families would have received any money without the threat of prosecution being part of 
the process.  
 
X Concluding thoughts 
 
The HSW Act has been enacted with a view to securing the health and safety of workers 
and workplaces.  It establishes high level duties and aims to achieve a greater degree of 
specificity and certainty for all relevant parties through ongoing interaction and information 
gathering.  This is aimed at developing regulations, guidance documents, and education 
material aimed at providing a higher degree of specificity and certainty for regulators and 
regulated parties.  This requires open communication between regulators and the regulated 
parties so that they can identify unsafe practices and work together to develop areas for 
improvement.  However, the Act also has strong deterrent measures and these are likely to 
inhibit openness and promote a defensive attitude on the part of regulated parties, who may 
seek to limit their potential legal liability.  This creates an unsatisfactory equilibrium where 
parties lack the optimal level of information and certainty to comply, on the one hand, and 
enforce, on the other. 
 
There are many factors that influence how regulatory parties behave and whether the 
regulatory goal can be achieved.  These include the extent to which the regulatory goal is 
clear and unambiguous to all parties, the characteristics and motivations of the regulated 
parties, the potential for other interested parties to participate in regulatory decisions, and the 
degree to which information is available to all relevant parties.   
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The Act seeks to address a number of these issues and, in particular, seeks to enhance the 
opportunity for worker participation.  However, the Act provides limited opportunities for 
parties other than organised work groups to participate in decision making.  This does not take 
account of the interests of the broader community in health and safety in the workplace.  The 
legislation includes duties to ensure that no person is harmed by the actions of workers and/or 
in the workplace.  Examples include members of the public who are lawfully at a workplace 
such as a shopping centre, a school or on a passenger ferry.   
 
Without additional guidance or some form of authoritative decision making, it is possible 
for parties to be unclear about what their regulatory responsibilities are.  Prosecution may 
provide the mechanism for some of this confusion to be clarified through the development of 
a body of case law capable of providing guidance to regulators and regulated parties.  The 
prosecution process is likely to play a role in advancing common thinking and consistency in 
the application of health and safety regulation through the courts operating as ‘umpire’ and 
establishing legal precedent that can guide future action.  However there are disadvantages 
with this in that courts do not necessarily consider a representative range of cases. 
 
On a practical level, prosecution is a notoriously unpredictable process with the outcome 
being a product of many variables.  The ideal situation is where the law and facts are clear and 
the prosecution process is efficient resulting in an outcome that clearly represents justice to all 
parties.  However in reality this can be complicated by prolonged defended hearings resulting 
in unsatisfactory sentences limited due to financial capacity or in some cases because the 
defendant company has wound up and ceased to exist.  
 
There is the potential for some real tension if the assumption is that the courts will 
routinely assist by stepping in to resolve uncertainty or at least authoritatively inform decision 
making for health and safety outcomes.  This seems to be inconsistent with the concept of 
prosecuting as a last resort.  Relying on the Courts to resolve areas of legislative uncertainty 
could be seen as a very expensive and time-consuming ‘regulatory instrument’. 
 
Paradoxically, for prosecution to be successful, the law needs to be certain and clear, 
however prosecution often deters the open communication necessary for this.  As a result, 
there is the risk that regulators will fail in their efforts to enforce or there will be prolonged 
and expensive litigation over ambiguous terms.  The aim is for the parties to engage in a 
regulatory conversation with a view to gathering useful information and distilling this into 
rules and guidance.  However, the chilling and unpredictable nature of the prosecution process 
may create distrust and mean that the parties are not willing to openly communicate.   
 
A means of addressing this is for regulators to have, and clearly publicise, a policy setting 
out their proposed approach to enforcement which will include a range of measures and 
criteria for their use.  This could clearly signal to regulated parties when they should fear 
prosecution and when they can be more open in their interaction with the regulator.  However, 
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there is a danger that, where operators consider that enforcement action is too predictable, this 
may cause complacency and reduce incentives to operate safely where this comes at a cost. 
 
In New Zealand health and safety regulation, the capacity for the regulator to take a 
strategic approach to enforcement is complicated by the potential for private prosecution.  
New Zealand has no ability to take a civil action when personal injury occurs.144  However, 
health and safety legislation provides for private prosecutions where the regulator decides not 
to prosecute.  As I have discussed above, recent law changes may cause victims to seek 
prosecution as a means to obtain financial compensation that they would otherwise not get.  
This could result in pressure on regulators to prosecute and an increased number of private 
prosecutions. 
 
All of these issues remain to be seen once the Act is in force.  While New Zealand can 
look to the Australian experience for some indication of how compliance and enforcement is 
likely to operate in practice, there are some key differences between the two jurisdictions.  In 
particular, New Zealand has the accident compensation regime which prohibits civil action for 
personal injury.  The New Zealand HSW Act also has private prosecutions.  The New Zealand 
experience will, therefore, be unique to this country.   
 
While the new legislation was developed following a crisis, the legislation will need to be 
sufficiently flexible, robust, and fit for purpose to promote workplace health and safety in a 
wide range of future situations.  It is clear that there are challenges ahead for all relevant 
parties if the objective of the Act is to be met and some progress is to be made towards 
Worksafe’s goal of ensuring that ‘Everyone who goes to work comes home healthy and 
safe’.145 
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